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SUMMARY 
 
The  system  of  multilateral  rules  and  institutions  that  constitutes  the  global 
economic  governance  regime  trails  the  rapid  transformation  of  the  world 
economy and the rise of pressing global issues. It faces significant challenges 
such as the resurgence of economic nationalism. It needs to adapt to changes in 
the  geopolitical  background  and  to  a  growing  number  and  diversity  of 
participants  in  global  economic  integration.  It  must  learn  to  coexist  with 
regionalism and the market-led governance. 
 
It is possible for globalisation to proceed with weak global governance, but not 
without significant risks to its sustainability. The EU, which has a stake in the 
multilateral  system  and  most  likely  a  comparative  advantage  in  institutional 
design, should be a key player in its reform agenda. The difficulty of the task is 
no excuse for avoiding it and for hiding behind US leadership. To equip itself 
with the ability to take initiatives towards reform, the EU requires changes in its 
own  internal  governance  and  its  external  representation.  Contrary  to 
conventional wisdom, these changes need not imply a federalisation of external 
relations. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
  
It is hard to escape the impression that global economic governance trails the 
rapid transformation of the world economy and the rise of pressing new issues. 
The suspension of global trade negotiations in July 2006 highlights the difficulty 
of delivering on the multilateral front and is bound to give further impetus to the 
proliferation of regional trade agreements. The two global institutions long seen 
as most effective, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, 
have lost relevance. The IMF’s core business of conditional financial assistance is 
threatened  by  Asian  disaffection  and  Latin  American  detachment,  and  its 
attempted  resurrection  as  a  venue  for  managing  global  current  account 
imbalances is a high-risk gamble. The World Bank has already been to a large 
extent  crowded  out  from  project  lending  by  the  development  of  financial 
markets.  
 
At  the  same  time,  mounting  issues  remain  unresolved.  The  labour  market 
consequences of globalisation are a cause for concern in almost all countries, 
but the International Labour Organisation is as marginal as ever. Population is 
on  the  rise  in  some  of  the  poorer  regions  on  Earth  and  a  new  wave  of 
migrations has started, but the International Organisation on Migrations remains 
almost unnoticed. Almost ten years after it was signed, the Kyoto protocol on 
global warming is still rejected by the US and major developing economies, and 
even  those  countries  that  support  it  frequently  make  insufficient  efforts  to 
enforce it at home. In addition,, the shifting supply and demand patterns for 
fossil fuels, water and other natural resources create scope for new tensions, 
but  no  meaningful  international  response  has  emerged  to  establish  proper-
functioning markets and avert the risk of conflict.  
 
To be sure, there are certainly some brighter spots. The Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), the oldest multilateral institution, is a valuable venue for joint 
initiatives  and  dialogue  between  central  banks.  More  generally,  cooperation 
between technical and sector-specific agencies is frequently effective. However, 
there is a clear contrast between the rapid pace of market-led integration and 
slow institutional developments at the multilateral level.  
 
This situation raises major, perhaps unprecedented policy challenges. Yet the 
balance  of  economic  and  political  power  makes  addressing  these  challenges 
more difficult than at any time in recent decades. Global economic governance 
was  a  stable and  relatively  simple  game  in  a  Western  hemisphere  under  US 
leadership.  It  is  made  much  more  unstable  and  complex  by  the  rise  in  the 
number and diversity of players, the growing weight of new economic powers, 
increasing US scepticism about ‘foreign entanglements’, and Europe’s continued 
focus on its own internal integration.  
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How Europeans should respond to these challenges is a difficult question, and 
they tend to have mixed feelings. On the one hand, they see themselves as 
supporters of strong global rules and effective international institutions, and are 
more comfortable than others with the implied limitations to sovereignty. Having 
established  a  system  of  supranational  governance  at  the  regional  level, 
Europeans tend to see global governance as a natural extension, and regard the 
EU as a laboratory for what the world of tomorrow could look like. On the other 
hand,  they  remain  reluctant  to  exercise  leadership  and  initiate  reform.  Even 
though the EU has been enterprising on trade and global warming, its actual 
policy record in those fields is mixed at best). It has generally been a follower 
on financial matters, its actions on development assistance are inconsistent, and 
it  is  divided  on  many  issues  such  as  migration.  Furthermore,  the  EU’s  own 
complex  governance  system  raises  issues  of  internal  consensus-building  and 
external  representation  that  frequently  prevent  Europeans  from  taking 
initiatives.  
 
This raises significant strategic questions for Europe. First, is the sorry state of 
global governance a cause for serious concern or can it persist without much 
damage?  After  all,  whatever  the  travail  of  international  negotiations,  world 
growth is currently more buoyant than ever and concrete economic integration 
continues at a rapid pace. Second, assuming the global regime is in need of 
change, should the EU aim at taking initiatives in the reform process or should it 
remain a follower?  Third,  assuming the EU does intend to push  for reforms, 
what changes in its internal arrangements and external representation does it 
need to implement to be an effective player?  
 
Section 2 of this paper presents the state of global governance, and section 3 
discusses whether its malaise should be taken seriously. Section 4 is devoted to 
the role of the EU so far. Policy options for the future, recommendations and 
conclusions are proposed in section 5.  
2  THE MALAISE ABOUT GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 
 
The past 25 years: big changes, little reform 
 
In  the  last  quarter  century,  the  world  economy  has  undergone  profound 
changes. The global economy of the early 21
st century has little in common with 
that  of  the  early  1980s,  when  a  collection  of  integrating,  but  still  highly 
segmented  national  economies  coexisted  with  quasi-autarkic  blocks  (China, 
India, the Soviet Union and its satellites) representing about half the total world 
population.  The  world  today  has  even  less  in  common  with  the  even  more 
fragmented world of the early post-war period, when a few countries started  
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rebuilding the world trade regime. Yet the global economic governance regime – 
the set of global rules that govern international economic relations, the network 
of institutions that support and enforce those relations and the processes that 
steer change in this system – has not undergone a parallel transformation.  
 
The changes that have taken place should certainly not be dismissed. The core 
institutions have taken up new roles – the IMF, for instance, has moved from 
financing current account deficits in the fixed exchange rate world of the early 
post-World War II decades to managing debt crises, marshalling the transition 
to the market and addressing financial account crises. Flexible responses to the 
transformation  of  the  trade  scene  have  been  found  through  the  creation  of 
informal negotiation groupings within the WTO. Also, ad hoc structures such as 
the Financial Stability Forum have been created to steer cooperation between 
institutions.  
 
But reforms have remained limited to adaptation and tinkering within the post-
war system. On the face of it, the only significant institutional reform over the 
past 25 years was the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism in 1995. The other essential pillars of the post-
war economic order – the UN system, the GATT, the Bretton Woods institutions 
– as well as the less-than-essential institutions have remained unchanged. The 
International Energy Agency, created after the first oil shock, has not undergone 
meaningful reform. It remains a consumers’ cartel in front of a producers’ cartel. 
In  the  Group  of  Seven  (G7),  first  convened  in  1975–1976,  the  key  players 
remain the same narrow group. Both the addition of Russia in 1998 at head-of-
state level and the new habit of inviting other guests to G8 meetings have made 
only minor difference. Even the more significant creation of a Group of Twenty 
(G20) in 1999 based on the same model as the G7 (but only at finance ministers 
level)  and  the  increasing  role  it  has  played  have  not  challenged  the  overall 
steering role of the G7.   
 
Attempts  at  more  ambitious  institutional  reform  have  been  rejected  or  have 
ended in  failure. Grand schemes for creating new institutions outlined in the 
1980s  and  the  1990s,  such  as  an  Economic  Security  Council  overseeing  the 
specialised institutions, a Global Competition Authority, or a Global Bankruptcy 
Court,  have  never  taken  off.  Even  the  more  down-to-earth  Multilateral 
Agreement  on  Investment  negotiated  in  1995–1998  within  the  OECD  was 
eventually still-born. The attempted revamping of the IMF through the creation 
of a Sovereign Debt Resolution Mechanism (SDRM), proposed in 2001 by Anne 
Krueger, then the Fund’s first deputy managing director, met the same fate. The 
handling  of  environmental  issues  offers  a  mixed  record:  Some  technical 
agreements have met their goals, most remarkably the 1987 Montreal protocol 
on substances that deplete the ozone layer. However, the biggest environmental 
challenge, global warming, remains essentially unaddressed in spite of climate  
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being the prime example of a global public good whose preservation must rest 
on international cooperation.  
 
On  the  whole,  considerable  changes  in  the  global  economy  have  not  been 
mirrored  in  the  structure  and  missions  of  global  institutions;  and  although 
institutions  have  adapted,  there  is  a  clear  disconnect  between  economic  and 
institutional developments.  
 
It is, in a way, a remarkable tribute to the architects who were “present at the 
creation” of the post-war order – mostly US policymakers, and a few British ones 
–  that  the  system  they  conceived  sixty  years  ago  has  been  able  to  serve  a 
rapidly  transforming  world  economy  without  major  institutional  reform. 
However, there are limits to the extent to which this flexibility allows the global 
governance system to adapt.  
 
Against  this  background,  two  recent  trends  affecting  the  world  economy  are 
especially noteworthy. The first one is a threat of a nationalist resurgence. The 
second is the challenge of the rise of regional arrangements. We now turn to 
these, before exploring more fundamental causes of the malaise.  
 
The nationalist threat  
 
An  obvious  limit  to  global  governance  is  the  reluctance  of  individual 
governments  to  renounce  sovereignty  and  accept  collective  decision-making. 
This is not new, but the landscape has been transformed as a consequence of 
several evolutions. To start with, there has been a change in US attitude. At the 
San Francisco conference in 1945, Harry Truman stated as US policy that “We 
have all to recognise, no matter how great our strength, that we must deny 
ourselves the licence to do always as we please”. By contrast, a central theme 
of George W. Bush’s re-election campaign in 2004 was that the US would not 
ask for a “permission slip” before taking decisions. Looking ahead, the US also 
seems  to  be  hesitant  as  regards  the  potential  role  of  global  institutions  in 
ensuring that the emergence of new global powers like China and India does not 
threaten its vital economic interests. 
 
It  may  be  debatable  whether  this  apparent  US  drift  is  a  key  driver  of  what 
increasingly looks like a widespread revival of economic nationalism, or just a 
consequence of the same underlying causes. At least, it serves as an excuse: 
claims of ‘economic patriotism’ in France and similar attitudes in other European 
countries often cite US opposition on national security grounds to takeovers by 
CNOOC and Dubai Ports World as a meaningful precedent and as a justification 
for their own defensive proposals.  
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The most profound shift may however be the emergence of new powers which 
have a different attitude towards multilateralism. Key economic players in the 
first  decades  after  World  War  II  were  Europe  and  Japan,  which  had  been 
recently traumatized by nationalist hubris. China, India or Brazil do not share the 
same historical experience and can easily perceive multilateral commitments as 
excessive constraints on policies inspired by national interest. Furthermore, in 
East  Asia  the  traumatic  experience  of  the  financial  crises  of  1997–1998  has 
fuelled sentiment that the multilateral system cannot be trusted – hence the 
reliance on self-insurance through the building up of foreign exchange reserves.     
    
Energy  is  another  illustration.  Since  the  fear  of  resource  scarcity  has  re-
emerged,  national  governments  in  developed  and  developing  countries  have 
been busy securing access to oil fields through the strengthening of bilateral 
links  with  oil  and  gas  producers.  Despite  emerging  efforts  to  create  an  EU 
energy policy, the world has a long way to go before the need to ensure energy 
security can be taken up collectively rather than individually.  
 
The regional challenge  
 
There  is  a  striking  contrast  between  the  relative  immobility  of  the  global 
governance system and the blossoming of regional initiatives. The evolution is 
well documented for trade, a field where all regional agreements have to be 
notified to the WTO. Since the WTO was created, about 130 such agreements 
have been reported, more than in the previous five decades taken together.  
 
However, regionalism is by no means limited to trade. The EU is obviously much 
more than a trade block and its mere existence has profound consequences for 
all  global  institutions.  Even  in  the  absence  of  changes  in  European 
representation  and  participation  in  the  governance  of  global  institutions  (we 
address this issue below), these institutions have started to take notice of the 
EU  dimension.  Interestingly,  the  IMF  has  recently  decided  to  examine  global 
imbalances  “collectively  with  systemically  important  members  and  even  with 
entities,  such  as  regional  groupings,  that  are  not  members”  --  a  clear 
recognition of the implications of the creation of a euro area within the EU.  
 
Regionalism  is  alive  on  all  continents,  but  most  remarkably  so  in  Asia.  The 
advance of Asian regional integration is notable not only for its breadth but also 
for  the  fact  that  it  is  explicitly  regarded  by  participants  as  an  alternative  to 
reliance on global institutions. At the time of the Asian crises in 1997–1998, the 
proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund was blocked by the G7 and countries in 
crisis were directed to the IMF instead. Since then, East Asian countries have 
been negotiating among themselves a series of regional monetary and financial 
cooperation  agreements.  To  be  sure,  this  cooperation  has  not  been  tested.  
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Nevertheless, it is intended to provide a form of collective financial security at 
the regional level.  
 
Regionalism, therefore, is a fact that cannot be simply ignored or opposed by 
the supporters of multilateralism. 
3  A CAUSE FOR CONCERN? 
 
Having  described  threats  and  challenges  to  multilateral  governance,  we  now 
attempt to understand what are the underlying difficulties, whether apparent 
disaffection with global governance should be regarded as a serious concern, 
and whether there are substitutes for it.   
 
Why disaffection?  
 
Four  underlying  factors  make  the  task  of  global  governance  increasingly 
demanding.  
 
To  start  with,  the  diversity  of  preferences  within  the  world  economy  has 
increased  dramatically.  Global  governance  traditionally  involves  a  trade-off 
between economies of scale and differences in preferences. The more diverse 
countries are, the less they tend to agree on devolving policy responsibilities to 
a supranational entity. Yet beyond the increase in the number of players (Figure 
1), differences in historical backgrounds and development levels are bound to 
result in differences in preferences. This simply increases the cost of agreeing 
on  a  common  response  and  makes  compromise  on  any  subject  much  more 
difficult  to  reach,  even  when  increased  interdependence  simultaneously 
increases the benefits of cooperation. In sum, “the multiplicity of countries, their 
divergent historical experiences and the differences in the quality of the regimes 
they  live  under  […]  make  it  difficult  to  ensure  the  provision  of  global  public 
goods” (Wolf, 2004).   
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Figure 1  Number of countries taking part in multilateral trade negotiations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WTO. 
  
Second,  among  countries  of  unequal  development  level,  many  global  issues 
involve an international distributional dimension that compounds the difficulty of 
reaching agreement. This is obviously the case for debt relief, but is true also for 
trade  liberalisation,  since  countries  benefiting  from  the  preferential  trade 
agreements in existence are bound to lose from an alignment of trade tariffs. 
This also applies to policies designed to tackle global environmental challenges, 
for which equity issues are compounded by the intertemporal dimension: the 
prime objection of emerging countries to curbing greenhouse gas emissions is 
that  developed  countries  had  a  free  ride  on  the  global  environment  in  the 
previous  stages  of  their  development.  In  principle,  those  obstacles  can  be 
addressed – at least for a transition period – through international redistribution. 
In  fact,  some  redistribution  is  already  taking  place  through  development 
assistance  and  the  asymmetric  allocation  of  greenhouse  emission  quotas. 
However, the distributional problem remains extremely difficult to tackle unless 
a  benevolent  hegemon  stands  ready  to  internalise  the  problem  and  buy  off 
opposition.  
 
Third, globalisation is divisive within developed and developing societies. The 
extent  of  its  contribution  to  the  rise  of  within-countries  inequality  and  job 
insecurity is disputed, but the most basic models of integration through trade, 
capital flows and migration point to distributional effects that create winners and 
losers. Furthermore, in many instances, global institutions are regarded as the 
source  of  globalisation  itself  and  of  its  deleterious  consequences,  thereby 
weakening their political legitimacy.   
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Fourth,  and  not  least,  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  has  removed  an  powerful 
incentive to collective action. The change in the attitude of the United States, 
which is now more inclined to adopt a multi-track strategy that includes regional 
agreements and unilateral initiatives as alternatives to the multilateral route
2, 
has probably less to do with economic factors than with political factors. Being 
now the world’s biggest debtor, the US is certainly not in a neutral position on 
trade, exchange rates and global finance, but similar issues (though on a smaller 
scale) also arose at the time of the Bretton Woods system with the accumulation 
of dollar balances by European countries. It is true also that the US position in 
the world economy offers opportunities for regulatory leadership, but this again 
was even more the case in the past. On the political side, however, major shifts 
have  taken  place.  US  national  security  no  longer  calls  for  cementing  an 
economic coalition of states in the same way that it did in the Cold War period. 
As scholars of international relations often say, the Cold War glue has gone. The 
so-called US “war on terror” justifies a targeted monitoring of financial flows and 
specific development assistance efforts. However, it does not require a system 
of economic alliances to bind countries together.   
 
There  are  therefore  structural  factors  behind  the  problems  faced  by  global 
governance.  The  question  becomes,  can  we  dispense  of  global  rules  and 
institutions?  
 
Where is global governance needed? 
 
A deterioration of global  governance may not in itself be a  cause  for alarm. 
Institutional arrangements, after all, are means, not ends. The world has already 
experienced periods of high international interdependence with no multilateral 
international order. This was especially true during the first wave of globalisation 
in the decades before 1914, a period when the concept of global governance 
had not been invented. The framework of world economic interdependence was 
provided by a set of universally accepted core principles (such as adherence to 
the Gold Standard and free capital mobility), a network of bilateral agreements 
(especially on trade), and political ties (especially between the imperial powers 
and their dominions). Globalisation’s main driver, however, was the dynamism 
of private capital (Eichengreen 1996, Frieden 2006). Today’s world shares many 
of these features. 
  
To many practitioners, especially in the private sector, the value of an institution 
is what it is able to deliver. In this respect, the travails of multilateral trade 
negotiations have not prevented trade flows from expanding over the last ten 
years.  Moreover,  the  absence  of  a  multilateral  framework  for  foreign  direct 
                                                 
2   This is apparent in the document published by the White House on the national security strategy 
(US government, 2006).  
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investment has not prevented strong growth in capital flows (Figure 2). Global 
governance is thus confronted with a necessariness problem. 
 
Figure 2  World trade and foreign direct investment, 1980–2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bruegel calculations based on international sources. 
 
Alternatives to global governance: national leadership 
 
There are furthermore potentially efficient substitutes for global governance. A 
first one is national leadership: Countries holding a dominant position may de 
facto set rules for the global economy. This is typically the case for standards, 
which multinational companies need to apply to have access to corresponding 
markets. For example, US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are 
used by all US-listed companies and have therefore become a reference in many 
emerging markets such as Brazil and Israel, whose companies often list on the 
New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq. Similarly, product safety requirements in 
the EU are demanding and tend to be adopted by manufacturers worldwide, 
including for products sold outside Europe, especially on matters over which the 
US has no corresponding regulation.  
 
However, and notwithstanding issues of “hard” security which are outside the 
scope  of  this  paper,  such  rule-making  patterns  based  on  the  “benevolent 
hegemonism” of one player are often not sustained over the long term. The 
hegemon may succumb to the temptation of using its position to serve short-
term national interest and the followers may decide that their own interest is 
better  served  by  alternative  strategies.  This  is  illustrated  both  by  the  recent 
tendency of many countries, including those of the EU, to endorse International  
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Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as an alternative to US GAAP accounting 
rules,  and  by  the  growing  unease  in  the  US  about  EU-originated  product 
regulation.  
 
Alternatives to global governance: market-based rulemaking 
 
Another  substitute  for  governance  by  global  public  institutions  is  a  similar 
function, but exercised by private-sector organisations. Markets have an ability 
to self-organize without the direct involvement of international institutions and 
are generally faster in designing and reforming arrangements. This is especially 
true of financial markets, which have always been the spearhead of international 
integration and have developed spectacularly in the past 25 years.  
 
It is worth recalling that the widespread financial liberalisation of the last two 
decades has taken place without countries entering multilateral negotiations and 
taking on formal commitments, at least at a global level. While public institutions 
participate in the monitoring of financial fragilities, private rating agencies such 
as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s have established de facto global standards in 
the assessment of sovereign as well as private debts.  
 
Private-sector  global  governance  regimes  are  emerging  as  a  significant 
component  of  global  rule-making.  The  International  Organisation  for 
Standardisation (ISO, founded 1947), International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB, founded 1973) or Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN, founded 1998) are well-known examples. In addition, private initiative 
in development assistance is making inroads into the traditional domain of public 
institutions.  
 
As  expressed  by  Francis  Fukuyama  (2006),  “The  old  realist  model  of 
international  relations  that  sees  the  world  exclusively  organised  around 
sovereign  nation-states  simply  does  not  correspond  to  the  world  that  is 
emerging,  and  it  will  not  be  sufficient  to  meet  the  needs  of  legitimacy  and 
effectiveness  in  international  action  in  the  future.  […]  Formal  organisations 
acting on the basis of instructions that come up the accountability channels of 
sovereign  states  are  too  inefficient  to  suit  the  economic  needs  of  the  global 
economy.  We  have  accepted  a  trade-off  of  legitimacy,  transparency,  and 
accountability for the sake of efficient decision making in the economic realm”. 
 
This  does  not  need  to  be  regarded  as  a  threat  to  the  multilateral  system. 
Governance through multilateral institutions and rules can coexist with market 
self-organisation  and  can  even  find  positive  synergies  with  it.  Yet  this  does 
represent  a  challenge  as  governments  and  institutions  need  to  adapt  to  the 
emergence of new forms of governance.   
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Alternatives to global governance: regionalism 
 
A last alternative is regional governance. Regional institutions among countries 
sharing  similar  preferences  can  be  a  solution  to  the  problem  created  by 
differences  in  preferences,  even  when  externalities  are  truly  global.  To  the 
extent  that  the  rules  adopted  at  regional  levels  are  mutually  compatible  and 
regional governing institutions are in dialogue with each other, the need for a 
global framework is reduced. International trade is an interesting case where 
the expansion of regional arrangements now seems to be overtaking multilateral 
rules.  Competition  policy  is  another  example.  There  is  no  global  competition 
authority. However, the decisions of European and American authorities have 
extraterritorial  impact,  and  there  is  informal  cooperation  among  them.  Both 
authorities are careful to avoid situations of blatant inconsistency of their mutual 
doctrines, even though they may differ in individual cases such as the high-
profile cases on GE-Honeywell or Microsoft.  
 
Furthermore, the contrast between global and regional approaches is probably 
not as sharp as it is generally portrayed. The reason is that rarely, if at all, are 
international externalities either purely global or purely regional. To the extent 
that  externalities  are  instead  both  regional  and  global,  they  need  to  be 
addressed both regionally and globally, rather than at only one level. How this is 
done in practice varies a great across subject matters.  
 
Take  the  case  of  health.  Today,  all  communicable  diseases  have  a  global 
dimension  and  require  global  solutions.  At  the  same  time,  however,  many 
communicable diseases have an important region-specific dimension. It makes 
sense, therefore, that the World Health Organisation (WHO) is in fact a network 
that comprises a global headquarters and six regional offices dispersed across 
the world, as well as national health institutions that are affiliated to both the 
global organisation and the respective regional body. What is remarkable is the 
balance  between  the  regional  and  global  components  of  the  network,  with 
roughly the same proportion of resources (personnel and budget) allocated to 
the six regional offices and the global headquarters in Geneva. Although the 
network aspect of the WHO is not entirely immune to problems, it certainly plays 
a crucial role in controlling the international spread of communicable diseases 
within and between regions.  
 
There is no equivalent situation in the field of economic governance, though 
discussions on trade and IMF reform (Truman, 2006) have started taking the 
regional dimension into account. The IMF, the World Bank and the WTO have 
no regional office to which member countries are affiliated and which play an 
executive role. Nonetheless, some form of regional arrangement exists in each 
of  the  domains  pertaining  to  these  three  organisations,  but  the  relationship 
between regional arrangements and global institutions is weak at best. Only in  
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the  case  of  the  WTO  do  the  treaties  foresee  the  possibility  that  member 
countries form regional groupings and insist that they respect certain rules in 
doing so. However, the rules have been so weak that only one of the 130 or so 
regional  trade  agreements  (RTAs)  notified  to  the  WTO  has  actually  been 
formally endorsed by the organisation.
3 Even worse, the Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements (CRTA), which is supposed to verify the WTO compliance of 
RTAs, has generally been unable to reach a conclusion “due to various political 
and legal difficulties” (see Crawford and Fiorentino, 2005). Whether or not the 
new Transparency Mechanism for RTAs agreed by WTO members in June 2006 
will  actually  “help  break  the  current  logjam  in  the  WTO  on  regional  trade 
agreements…[and constitute] an important step towards ensuring that regional 
trade agreements become building blocks, not stumbling blocks to world trade” 
(Lamy, 2006) remains to be tested. In the meantime, the relationship between 
regional  trade  agreements  and  the  spirit  (if  not  the  letter)  of  the  WTO  will 
remain tenuous.   
 
The  upshot  is  that  there  is  probably  less  of  a  contradiction  between 
multilateralism and regionalism than usually thought, but that their coexistence 
needs  to  be  organised.  How  to  design  rules  and  institutions  to  this  end  is 
probably one of the major challenges for the years ahead.  
 
The cost of no governance 
 
Global governance should therefore neither be dismissed nor considered as the 
only possible way to manage economic globalisation. 
  
The prime reason why it should not be dismissed is that there are issues that 
call for global collective action. This is obviously the case where there are high 
global externalities, such as for the global environment, global epidemics and 
global financial crises. In this respect, the current regime of global economic 
governance is incomplete in several important areas.  
 
In a more subtle way, multilateral rules and institutions, though they may be 
painful to negotiate among a large number of countries with diverse domestic 
conditions,  offer  three  advantages  even  when  global  externalities  are  only 
moderate.  
 
First, they ensure more security than ad hoc arrangements. In time of stress or 
tension,  rules  provide  core  principles  to  which  to  refer  and  represent  legally 
enforceable  commitments.  Moreover,  institutions  offer  a  venue  for  settling 
disputes.  A  comparison  between  trade  and  FDI  may  clarify  the  point:  Global 
                                                 
3   This unique case is the customs union between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic set 
up after the break up of Czechoslovakia.  
  
  19 
trade is based on clear principles (such as national treatment and the most-
favoured-nation  clause);  the  WTO  treaty  explicitly  includes  safeguard  clauses 
and established a dispute settlement mechanism. All those elements are lacking 
for FDI. As a consequence, in the event of a dispute over a takeover, there can 
be no reference to universally accepted principles, no recourse to exceptional 
conditions, and no neutral venue for arbitration. This leaves the prevention of 
unilateral action and retaliation to the sole wisdom of the states.  
 
In other words, strong rules and legitimate institutions may help to ensure the 
resilience  of  global  economic  integration.  They  are  certainly  no  panacea  and 
their ability to resist pressure should not be overestimated. However, in times of 
crisis  and  threats  to  economic  integration,  rules  and  institutions  provide  a 
valuable response.  
 
Second, global institutions give a voice to all countries big and small and are 
accountable to these countries. Critics may complain about the distribution of 
votes  and  seats  or  about  the  lack  of  effective  accountability,  but  global 
institutions  ensure  a  degree  of  fairness  and  ownership  which  other  solutions 
necessarily  lack.  This,  also,  is  a  contribution  to  the  stability  of  economic 
integration. This stability, however fragile, would be lacking in a multipolar world 
in  which  integration  would  be  driven  by  private  initiatives  only,  without  the 
legitimacy that is provided by global rules and institutions.  
  
Third, institutions are a form of capital and can themselves be viewed as global 
public goods (Kindelberger, 1986). This is because established institutions which 
can rely on founding principles and internal governance rules can help tackling 
new issues as they emerge. They help cutting negotiation costs and avoiding the 
long and painful process of defining a collective response. Well-designed and 
well-governed institutions are therefore an asset for all participants in the world 
economy.  
 
Yet  like  all  public  goods,  global  public  goods  are  subject  to  the  free  rider 
problem  since  their  benefits  are  available  to  everyone.  Hence,  although 
everyone would be better off if countries agreed to provide global public goods, 
it is normally in the interests of individual countries to let others bear the cost. 
The  result  is  that  global  institutions  are  difficult  to  set  up  and  difficult  to 
maintain.  The  aftermath  of  World  War  II  was  an  exceptional  set  of 
circumstances that served as a catalyst for building both the multilateral system 
and regional institutions in Europe. In Asia, the 1997–1998 financial crises seem 
to have played a similar, albeit more limited role.  
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The tasks ahead 
 
Summing  up,  the  main  challenge  for  the  years  ahead is  to  adapt the  global 
governance system to the new global reality: a larger and more diverse set of 
countries; new priority such as migrations, climate change and energy security; 
geopolitical conditions that deeply differ from those of the previous decades; the 
rise  of  new  powers  with  strong  national  sentiments;  the  irreversible 
development of regionalism; and changing borders between the realms of public 
regulations  and  market  self-organisation.  This  will  require  initiative  and 
leadership. We now turn to the question of what role Europe can play in such a 
process. 
4  THE EU AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
 
If anything characterises Europeans’ attitude towards global governance, it is 
ambiguity.  
 
A champion of global rules 
 
On the one hand, there is a natural synergy between an effective EU and an 
effective  global  governance  regime.  In  international  economics  as  elsewhere, 
the  EU  is  the  champion  of  rules  (Laïdi,  2005).  The  reason  for  that  is 
straightforward: Unlike most states which originated in unilateral conquest, the 
EU is itself a rules-based endeavour. The entire history of European integration 
since  1950  has  been  a  patient  but  consistent  attempt  at  rebuilding  intra-
European relations on the basis of a system of laws, rules and decision-making 
procedures.  It  is  therefore  quite  natural  for  the  EU  to  envisage  international 
relations  in  the  same  way  and  to  champion  global  governance.  Hence,  for 
example, the EU’s active role in the creation of the International Criminal Court 
and the Kyoto protocol on global warming, both of which were rejected by the 
United  States.  Robert  Kagan  famously  characterized  Europe  as  being  “from 
Venus” and as “moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and 
rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation” (Kagan, 2002). This may 
also  be  linked  to  the  EU’s  possibilities  to  project  power  abroad.  The  EU  has 
many means to exercise “soft power” internationally and is increasingly doing 
so.  By  contrast,  the  exercise  of  hard  power  by  EU’s  members  and  partners 
generally tends to weaken the Union, as has been most graphically illustrated by 
the  conflict  in  Iraq.  The  EU  is  naturally  more  comfortable  in  a  world  of 
procedures and negotiations, and would have much to lose from a deterioration 
of multilateralism.   
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European public opinion is also very sensitive to the issue of globalisation and 
Europeans expect the EU  to help “manage” globalisation. In a 2003 survey
4, 
56% of EU15 respondents said that globalisation needed more regulation and 
61%  trusted  the  EU  to  ensure  that  globalisation  went  in  the  right  direction. 
Europeans also consistently assign to the EU, rather than to the member states, 
responsibility  for  participating  in  global  governance.  For  example,  a  recent 
survey indicates that 77% of respondents in the EU25 would like more decisions 
regarding the promotion of peace and democracy in the world to be taken at the 
EU  level.  The  corresponding  proportion  is  72%  for  the  protection  of  the 
environment and 70% for the prevention of major health problems
5. The notion 
that  there  are  global  issues  which  can  better  be  tackled  by  the  EU  than  its 
member states seems to receive strong support among Europeans.  
 
Finally, the Europeans have a major stake in the global governance regime. With 
the exceptions of the United Nations and the WTO, which are based on the one-
country-one-vote  principle,  most  international  institutions  have  an  internal 
allocation of power that reflects the world of yesterday rather than today, and 
Europe is, nominally at least, the biggest beneficiary in this (Table 1). This is 
particularly true in the Bretton Woods institutions, where the EU controls about 
one-third of the seats and the voting rights, not an oversized share in reference 
to  current  GDP,  but  a  clear  overrepresentation  by  most  other  measures.  As 
observed by Vijay Kelkar et al (2005), the combined votes of Brazil, China and 
India  in  the  Bretton  Woods  institutions  are  about  20%  below  those  of  Italy, 
Belgium and the Netherlands, while their combined GDP at market exchange 
rates is 23% larger, their combined GDP at PPP exchange rates is four times 
larger,  and  their  total  population  is  29  times  larger.  These  are  astonishing 
figures, which may explain why Asian countries feel so little ownership in the 
Bretton Woods institutions. The quota revision proposed by the IMF for adoption 
at its 2006 Singapore annual meeting does not change this overrepresentation 
in a significant way: it would reduce the EU share from 31.9% to 31.3%.   
 
 
 
                                                 
4   Special Eurobarometer survey on globalisation, November 2003.  
5   Eurobarometer survey on the future of Europe, May 2006. The survey did not include specific 
questions on the economic governance of globalisation.    
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Table 1   Weight  of  the  EU  in  international  economic  and  financial 
institutions. 
Institution  Votes* 
Current-dollar 
GDP 2005 
PPP-based  
GDP 2005  Population 
   EU Share  EU Share  EU Share  EU Share 
G7**  57.1  32.8  31.0  36.4 
   (4 of 7)          
G8**  50.0  31.9  29.2  30.3 
   (4 of 8)          
G20**  25.0  25.1  16.9  6.5 
   (5 of 20)         
OECD     38.1  36.9  38.5 
membership  63.3          
financing  39.8          
   (19 of 30)          
IEA  65.4  38.3  36.9  39.8 
   (17 of 26)         
IMF/WB***    30.3  21.0  7.2 
membership  13.6          
quotas****  31.9          
control  33.6          
seats  29.5          
   (25 of 184)          
WTO**  17.4  31.7  22.6  8.1 
   (26 of 149)          
Memorandum:             
UN    30.3  20.9  7.2 
membership  13.0          
financing  36.5          
   (25 of 192)          
 (*) Figures in brackets refer to the number of EU members of the total number of members. 
   
(**) The EU is not included in calculations for the G7 and G8 as they are not full members. The 
G20 has 19 members, plus the EU as an institutional member. In the WTO, the "European 
Communities" are counted as a separate member     
   
(***) For IMF and WB, "membership" gives the proportion of EU countries in total member 
countries, "votes" their share in the total quota-based votes, "control" the proportion of votes they 
control, assuming a country holding the chair controls the vote of the members in the constituency
   
(****) Before the quota revision tabled for the Singapore annual meeting   
 
Source for GDP and population: World Development Indicators database, World Bank and 
The World Factbook, CIA, August 2006.  
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An accidental player 
 
That said, Europe’s behaviour more than occasionally contradicts its stated goals 
and apparent interest in global governance. Although claiming to be a champion 
of multilateralism, the EU has in fact contributed toward challenging it by taking 
the initiative to negotiate a whole array of regional trade agreements. While all 
major  players  nowadays  have  developed  a  regional  strategy  alongside  their 
participation in multilateral institutions, it is the EU which launched the trend 
(Sapir, 1998).  
 
Moreover, the EU does not really play in global governance a role commensurate 
to its representation. The EU is undoubtedly a major player in international trade 
negotiations  where  it  has  clearly  stated  priorities  and  the  ability  to  push  for 
them. Whatever the negotiation setting, it is part in the game. The EU has also 
played  a  key  role  in  the  negotiation  of  the  Kyoto  protocol;  after  the  US 
withdrawal,  Europe  has  taken  the  leadership  in  pushing  for  ratification  and 
implementation.  However,  the  EU  has  kept  a  strikingly  low  profile  on  global 
macroeconomic  issues.  In  stark  contrast  to  the  US,  Europeans  have  not 
expressed any strong views so far on issues such as the unwinding of current 
account imbalances or the Chinese exchange rate. On the euro-dollar exchange 
rate, several mutually inconsistent opinions have been expressed by Europe’s 
ministers of finance and central bank governors. On the nature and speed of the 
US  current  account  adjustment,  Europeans  have  more  than  once  given  the 
impression that their best hope is for a exchange rate stability, while routinely 
exhorting the US to fiscal discipline and a correction of the external deficit. On 
the Chinese exchange rate, Europe has tended to follow the US lead, although 
Europe’s  interest  may  differ  substantially  from  that  of  the  US.  Euro  area 
policymakers thus seem to have refrained from drawing conclusions from the 
new de facto world status of their currency.  
 
On international finance, Europeans have certainly been part of the conversation 
within the G7, the G20, the Bretton Woods institutions and other public forums. 
They  may  even  claim  some  successes,  such  as  the  partial  reform  of  IMF 
governance  through  the  creation  of  the  International  Monetary  and  Financial 
Committee (IMFC), or the so-called involvement of the private sector in crisis 
resolution.  However,  careful  analysis  of  the  discussion  shows  that  Europeans 
have rarely set the agenda. They have often responded to new developments in 
a reactive manner, slowly adapting to events and adjusting to new (frequently 
US) proposals, and have almost never pushed for radical new ideas. The US 
behaved throughout the financial crises of the 1990s as the (most frequently, 
but not always, benevolent) hegemon of international finance. The EU did not  
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behave as a world monetary and financial power
6. Here again, the EU’s effective 
role does not seem to be commensurate with its members’ representation in the 
Bretton Woods organisations.  
 
Rather than being a consistent pillar of world economic governance, the EU can 
thus be characterised as an accidental player (Pisani-Ferry, 2005) – one which, 
depending  on  the  issue,  is  sometimes  at  the  table  and  sometimes  absent, 
sometimes vocal and sometimes silent.  
 
The root causes: incompatible views, or plain bad decision-making?  
 
Why  is  it  so?  The  two  main  hypotheses  to  explain  the  EU’s  inconsistency  in 
global economic governance are: (1) there are issues on which the EU is too 
divided to act, because preferences differ among its constituent member states, 
and  (2)  dysfunctional  internal  governance  prevents  the  EU  from  being  more 
assertive. If the first hypothesis is true, there is little the EU can do to become 
more effective. If it is the second, reforms of the internal governance are in 
order.   
 
The preference heterogeneity argument has some weight. Within an increasingly 
diverse  EU,  there  are  many  reasons  why  preferences  should  differ  and  this 
diversity should affect international economic relations. From cultural and policy 
traditions to degrees of openness and patterns of trade and financial integration, 
several factors can explain why the EU countries can have difficulties reaching 
common ground on global matters.  
 
However,  this  is  first  and  foremost  true  for  international  trade.  From 
development  levels  and  specialisation  patterns  to  the  functioning  of  labour 
markets and to domestic political institutions, there is every reason to consider 
that the economics and the political economy of trade liberalisation differ widely 
within the EU. Actually, surveys consistently indicate wide differences in public 
attitudes towards trade liberalisation within the EU. Despite these differences, 
the EU does have a common policy for trade. 
 
This leads to the dysfunctional governance hypothesis. The EU has put in place 
complex and diverse arrangements for organising its international economic and 
                                                 
6   Riccardo Faini, a former Executive Director with the IMF, and Enzo Grilli (2004) have attempted 
to measure quantitatively the influence of the US, the EU and Japan in the IMF and World Bank 
decisions by assessing whether the geographical lending pattern of those institutions reflects 
their respective bilateral trade or financial relations patterns. Their results suggest that the US 
and the EU are both influential, but the former more so than the latter. They especially contrast 
the importance of both trade and financial links for the US with the absence of any discernable 
influence of the EU’s financial links. This is an admittedly rather indirect measure that is subject 
to technical discussion, but it corresponds well to the casual observation that the US financial 
community is much more concerned by and vocal on IMF issues than its counterpart in Europe.  
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financial relations with the rest of the world. In some fields, policy responsibility 
is fully delegated to an EU institution – in most cases, the Commission or the 
ECB – which has been given a clear mandate to act. In others, responsibility is 
divided between member states which may endeavour to coordinate their views. 
It could be the inefficiency of some of its governance mechanisms that prevents 
the EU from playing the role it could play.  
 
An illustration: the EU and the IMF 
 
Apart  from  being  important  in  itself,  the  IMF  provides  an  interesting  testing 
ground. It is an institution where the EU is at the same time overrepresented in 
numbers and underrepresented in voice. According to Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, who 
prior to his appointment to the board of the European Central Bank was involved 
in the coordination of European positions in international monetary and financial 
affairs, “if EU countries wish to improve their collective influence in international 
issues and the IMF, some institutional changes in the way European interests 
are represented and promulgated may be necessary” (Bini Smaghi, 2004).  
 
Moreover,  for  reasons  already  given  a  reform  of  the  global  economic  and 
financial institutions that  would rebalance power within them is  not  simply a 
matter of fairness; it is also a necessary (though not self-evidently sufficient) 
means to ensure a sufficient degree of ownership in the multilateral system by 
emerging countries. The EU has every interest in encouraging all countries to 
rely on the multilateral system. The more unbalanced this system, the stronger 
the  temptation  will  be  for  those  who  feel  underrepresented  to  look  for 
alternative solutions, especially (but not only) in East Asia.  
 
Pressure is mounting for a redistribution of power. The 2006 Singapore quota 
revision is explicitly regarded as a first step in a process that would lead, by 
2008,  to  a  more  substantial  rebalancing.  The  US  administration  has 
unambiguously expressed its support for this rebalancing. Europeans, however, 
are  tempted  to  procrastinate.  Among  them,  the  question  of  a  common 
representation remains divisive.  
 
The IMF voting structure allows us to compare various arrangements in terms of 
power, using the standard game theory indices that measure a player’s power 
by how frequently he is likely to be the swing voter in a decision. True enough, 
there are very few instances in which IMF executive directors actually vote. But 
the underlying power structure serves as a benchmark against which players 
measure  their  influence.  The  fierce  controversies  associated  with  each  quota 
rebalancing are a clear indication that the issue matters a great deal.  
 
In a recent paper, Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (2006) finds that, if they were to form a 
coalition, the EU-25 member countries would be, by far, the dominant power in  
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the IMF with a voting power index of 48% – the next one being the US with 
7%. An important issue, however, is whether individual member states would 
gain or lose from entering such a coalition.  
 
On the face of it, they would all gain considerably. Suppose that EU countries 
decide to pool their votes in a single European seat and that this seat is granted 
the same voting power as the United States (not an unreasonable assumption in 
view of the quota formula and the balance of power within the Fund). Further 
assume that the internal EU decision is determined by simple majority voting 
using the current IMF weights. Under these conditions, calculation by Leech and 
Leech (2005), based on power index methodology
7, shows that all EU countries 
would gain voting power in the IMF (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3  EU countries voting power with an EU caucus relative to current 
voting power within IMF.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Leech and Leech (2005). 
 
                                                 
7   Formally, the power index for any EU member is calculated as a product of two Penrose indicies, 
one measuring the power of  the single EU seat and the  other  measuring the power of  the 
member in the internal EU decision making.  
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However, IMF quotas substantially differ from EU voting weights and a common 
representation of the EU would use EU weights and voting rules, rather than 
IMF quotas or votes. This raises the issue of power redistribution among EU 
countries. As shown in Figure 4, merging EU members’ representation in the 
IMF based on EU voting rules would create both winners (Poland, Spain and the 
smaller countries whose vote counts more within the EU) and losers (Germany, 
the UK and France, as well as some medium-sized ones such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands). The extent of this redistribution is significant because the current 
(Nice) EU voting system
8 is much more biased in favour of small countries than 
the  IMF system. 
 
Figure 4   Voting  weights  in  EU  relative  to  voting  weights  among  EU 
countries in IMF. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bruegel estimates.  
 
This picture however overlooks the fact that a member’s voting weight is not the 
same as its voting power. The distinction is crucial. An individual EU member’s 
power  in  the  IMF  under  a  unified  representation  would  depend  on  both  a 
member’s power to determine the EU vote in the IMF and on the aggregate 
voting power of the single EU seat – which could in theory make all countries 
winners, even though the size of the gain would not be uniform.  
                                                 
8   The draft constitution retained a similar system.   
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However, there would actually be more losers in this move since internal EU 
decision would need to be determined by the notoriously inefficient system of 
qualified  majority  voting  established  by  the  Nice  Treaty  (Figure  5).  This  is 
because the large supermajorities required to make a decision under the Nice 
system would in fact prevent the EU from benefiting from its power within the 
Fund. The largest countries would logically be the biggest losers.  
 
The calculations presented here should not be taken at face value. What they 
indicate is that the large countries would lose power in the IMF on issues where 
the EU is internally divided. They would still gain, however, on issues where 
there  is  a  clear  majority  opinion  within  Europe.  Two  conclusions  can 
nevertheless be drawn from this analysis. The first is that internal governance 
matters  considerably  and  that  the  EU’s  role  in  global  governance  cannot  be 
discussed  without  reference  to  it.  This  lends  support  to  the  hypothesis  that 
Europe’s  sometimes  haphazard  behaviour  in  international  fora  is  due  to  its 
internal rules. 
 
Figure 5   EU countries voting power with an EU chair (Nice voting system) 
relative to current voting power within the IMF. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Leech and Leech (2005).  
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The second conclusion regards the Bretton Woods institutions. The perspective 
of losing influence through both a reduction of voting weights in the IMF and, 
possibly, the merger of European representations, can serve as a justification for 
defending the status quo. Procrastination, however, would be a costly mistake. 
Europe’s  share  in  world  GDP  is  rapidly  declining  as  a  consequence  of  its 
demography and of the accelerated development of major emerging countries. 
It is bound to decline further – and fast. In institutions, however, compromises 
on power-sharing tend to be lasting and to perpetuate a certain distribution of 
power long after it has disappeared in the real world. The more the adjustment 
is delayed, the less economic and political weight Europe will have when it takes 
place, and the less likely it is to be able to negotiate a satisfactory arrangement. 
5  IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE 
 
This paper has argued that because the state of global economic governance is 
anything but stable, the European Union needs more clarity of vision for the 
debates ahead. The policy implications of our analysis can be summarized into 
three main points.  
 
1.  Global economic governance matters. There could be a sense that the 
apparent  loss  of  purpose  of  many  global  institutions  –  the  UN  deemed 
‘irrelevant’ by the US, the World Bank squeezed out by the private sector, 
the drying up of IMF lending activity, the WTO negotiations stalled without a 
clear prospect of revival – is not a matter of significant concern. After all, 
security  issues  are  dealt  with  outside  the  UN,  the  expansion  of  financial 
markets  is  welcome,  emerging  markets  are  becoming  more  stable,  and 
international trade is booming, to name a few examples.  
 
However,  downplaying  the  importance  of  global  institutions  would  be  a 
costly mistake. While some missions of global institutions have indeed been 
rendered obsolete, others are more crucial than ever in the current age of 
unprecedented economic interdependence. The long-term sustainability of 
current  trade  patterns  is  heavily  dependent  on  a  functioning  multilateral 
framework. Financial stability problems will again arise, and the IMF remains 
the  best  available  tool  to  monitor  and  prevent  the  corresponding  risks. 
Furthermore, global institutions can be extremely helpful in times of crisis as 
they provide ready-made channels for communication and coordination.  
 
The absence of global economic institutions in certain areas is also a source 
of  concern.  Problems  which  call  for  new  forms  of  global  economic 
governance  are  becoming  ever  larger,  and  disaster  might  loom  if  they 
remain unaddressed. This is most prominently the case for the economic 
mechanisms to prevent and address global warming. The problem of global  
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natural resources (including fossil fuel and water) is also increasingly likely 
to require attention.  
 
2.  Reform  is  needed.  A  first  obvious  area  for  action  is  on  trade,  where 
regionalism  is  both  a  fact  and  a  natural  response  to  the  diversity  of 
preferences  in  the  world  economy.  But  for  regionalism  to  support  rather 
than  undermine  multilateralism,  principles  need  to  be  agreed  and 
safeguards need to be defined. Being itself the archetype of a strong and 
successful regional grouping, the EU ought to constructively contribute to 
this conversation.  
 
The Bretton Woods institutions are another immediate area for reform. EU 
member states should be proactive in specifying a mandate for the EU as a 
catalyst  for  reform  of  the  IMF’s  and  World  Bank’s  governance.  This  is  a 
necessary  (if  not  sufficient)  condition  to  ensure  the  legitimacy  of  these 
institutions, which have played a helpful and important role in the past and 
will do so again in the future.  
 
Third,  Europeans  should  see  it  as  their  responsibility  to  ensure  the 
emergence  of  a  globally  shared  approach  to  address  the  causes  and 
consequences of global warming. It is becoming increasingly obvious that 
the EU’s adhesion to the Kyoto Protocal is not enough to face the challenges 
of climate change.  
 
Beyond  these  steps,  it  could  be  argued  that  there is  a  need  for  a  more 
political  institution  that  defines  priorities  and  steers  institutional  changes 
when needed. The G7, which accounts for about 40% of world GDP and 
10% of world population, no longer has the legitimacy to fulfil this function
9. 
Various proposals have been made, including the creation of a G20 at head-
of-state level (accounting for about 80% of world GDP and 60% of world 
population)
10. However, it remains to be seen how far such a device could 
go in creating a genuine prospect for collective action given the diversity of 
the participants.  
 
3.  External  influence  requires  efficient  internal  governance.  In 
particular, the ability of the EU to act as a global player is often hampered 
by inefficient internal arrangements. This should not be read as a plea for 
federalisation of external representation. Member states can retain control 
rights  through  the  definition  of  a  mandate  and  the  supervision  of  its 
implementation. But the reform of the EU’s external representation requires 
                                                 
9    Measured at purchasing-power parity exchange rates. 
10   See Linn and Bradford (2006). Kenen, Shafer, Wicks and Wyplosz (2004) propose instead the 
creation  of  a  Council  for  International  Financial  and  Economic  Cooperation  of  at  most  15 
members.  
  31 
a definition of the ways in which various national views are mediated and 
the  external  representatives  are  monitored.  There  would  be  no  point  in 
aiming at more external influence while at the same time preventing it from 
existing because of an internal inability to reach decision.  
 
4.  The  European  Union  can  no  longer  hide  behind  the  US.  For  the 
economic and political reasons that have been developed in this paper, the 
US is less ready than at any time since World War II to exercise constructive 
leadership in global economic governance, and this trend is unlikely to be 
reversed any time soon. European policymakers should be ready to assume 
the responsibilities that shifting patterns of leadership may imply for them.  
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